The UK government's chief scientist, John Beddington, last month demanded intolerance towards the "pseudoscience" used to challenge government science on certain policy issues. However, none of the growing range of public issues involving important scientific questions can be reduced, as Beddington did, simply to "science" or "pseudoscience".
The UK government's scientific advisory apparatus routinely imposes this 'scientism' -to science's own public detriment.
Public disagreement with policy commitments such as genetically modified crops or vaccination of children against measles, mumps and rubella (MMR) is rarely based on opposition to the science itself, even when science is used exclusively to justify policy. People are more likely to object to the brushing aside of their reasonable questions by scientists and policy-makers, and to the exclusion of important factors such as the pervasive exaggeration of scientific understanding and predictive control.
Take the now-discredited claim that the MMR vaccine Intolerance: retain healthy scepticism
The UK government's chief scientist, John Beddington, has done much to promote the potential of science to address pressing global imperatives. But in a straight-talking speech last month, he urged his audience of 300 government scientists to be "grossly intolerant" of "pernicious" and "fatuous" "pseudoscience". In this he included: scepticism of genetic modification technology; "illegitimate" advocacy of environmental precaution in response to unknowns; and suggestions that science is subject to morality. This approach is a rejection not just of irrational denial but of entirely reasonable social scepticism concerning science itself.
It is ironic that defence of scientific rationality is often so emotive. Science does not monopolize social rationality. Although imperfectly realized, the principal distinctions between science and, say religion, politics, commerce or the media are arguably social practices of organized scepticism. Open publication, peer review, experimentation and critical respect for evidence help promote reasoned argument. But rational scepticism is as important outside as inside the social practices of science. Hence the motto of Britain's Royal Society, 'Nullius in verba': take nothing solely on authorityeven from scientists.
Suppression of rational scepticism of science is also potentially undemocratic. The social impact of innovation David Edgerton wants scientists to be more vocal in opposing hare-brained innovations that stand little or no chance of success (Nature 471, 27-29; 2011) .
I agree that we place too high a value on innovation for its own sake, but fail to see what this has to do with Luddism. The objection of the Luddites was not to money being wasted on machines that would not work. On the contrary, the machines that the Luddites tried to destroy worked only too well.
The lesson to be learned from Luddism is both more important and more sophisticated: when evaluating the worth of an innovation, we should be concerned with its wider social implications, as well as its narrowly economic ones. In other words, scientists should have consciences. 
